Still, Kouwenhoven’s figures combined with
Broadberry’s point to a prewar Soviet/German productivity ratio of at most 40 per cent. When synthetic comparisons are difficult, it is commonplace to turn to indirect, usually physical indicators. A few are collected in table 5.4.
From a Soviet source (although not, originally, intended for wide circulation), they present a relatively favourable picture, suggesting that Soviet prewar industrial production was much more than 40 per cent of Germany’s; but they also indicate (as one would expect) that the
Soviet advantage was greater in basic materials, fuels, and energy, than in more highly fabricated products. However, such comparisons are almost always biassed by missing products in ways which are not always immediately apparent. The source cited in the table draws our
attention to one which would be counted to the Soviet advantage -- the fact that the Soviet Union produced oil, where Germany did not. On the other hand, the table entirely ignores fabricated products other than
industrial machinery, especially those important for transport,
communications, information, and consumption, in which Germany certainly had the advantage. Thus no firm conclusions may be drawn from the table. Certainly it does not justify any greater optimism about the production potential of Soviet industry than the measures
suggested by Kouwenhoven.
It is worth adding that the impact of the first years of conflict would swing the overall balance further in Germany’s favour. Territorial expansion would add the industrial assets of much of continental Europe to Germany’s side.